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  FACTS, FORMAL OBJECTS AND ONTOLOGY1 
 
  Kevin Mulligan (Geneva)   
 
 
§1 The Ontological Zoo 
§2 An Argument for Facts from Knowledge 
§3 Facts are not Ontologically Fundamental 
 
 
 What is a fact ? Are there such things ? Three answers to the first questions are 
 
  facts are true propositions;  
 
facts are not true propositions but rather obtaining states of affairs, atomic and 
non-atomic;  
 
facts are neither propositions, nor obtaining states of affairs, and are always 
atomic. 
 
In order to understand the relation between the three answers it is useful to suppose that 
there are propositions, obtaining states of affairs and facts and then ask what relations there might 
be between such entities. One plausible answer to this question suggests that, if there are facts, 
then facts are obtaining states of affairs (§1). But are there such things ? One argument in favour 
of facts, the argument from knowledge, is presented (§2). Although no ontology should be 
incompatible with epistemology, a realist metaphysician will not attach much importance to an 
argument for facts from knowledge or from any other mind-dependent phenomenon. This is 
because such a metaphysician assumes that, if there are facts, then facts are ontologically basic. 
Perhaps he thinks that facts are ontologically basic and that all facts are atomic. I give some 
reasons for thinking that no fact is ontologically fundamental (§3). If this is correct, the argument 
that knowledge requires facts tells us nothing about what is ontologically basic. A further 
consequence of the view that no fact is ontologically basic is that the motivation for the view that 
facts are always atomic disappears. And that there are obtaining states of affairs of all types of 
logico-ontological complexity, if there are any obtaining states of affairs, is indeed suggested by 
the account of the relations between propositions, states of affairs and facts in §1. 
 
 
 
§1 The Ontological Zoo 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Herbert Hochberg, Peter van Inwagen and Achille Varzi for their critical comments on versions of this 
material. 
 
 Propositions, states of affairs, facts, concepts, classes and properties clearly all belong 
together. They are creatures of a kind. Call them formal objects. Certain properties and relations 
borne by formal objects clearly also belong together: being true, obtaining or subsisting, falling 
under concepts, exemplifying properties. Call these formal properties and relations. Romanesque 
metaphysics and ontologies dispense as far as possible with formal objects, properties and 
relations. Baroque metaphysics and ontologies embrace them happily. 
 
 Much discussion of formal objects concentrates on the (in)eliminability of (apparent) 
reference to such objects or on their (in)dispensability. The interrelations between formal objects, 
properties and relations, on the other hand, are rarely attended to. In what follows, two types of 
interrelations will be important: equivalence and explanation. We suppose, to begin with, that 
there are propositions, facts, concepts and properties and ask what the relations between the 
species in our ontological zoo might be. 
 
 Consider 
 
(1)  Sam is sad 
(2)  The proposition that Sam is sad is true 
(3)  The state of affairs that Sam is sad obtains 
(4) Sam falls under the concept of sadness 
(5) Sam belongs to the class of the sad 
(6) Sam exemplifies the property of sadness 
 
If there are propositions etc., then the following seems very plausible: 
 
(7) (1) iff (2) iff (3) iff (4) iff (5) iff (6) 
 
Consider now the relation of explanatory priority. Should we accept  
 
(8) If (1) & (2), (2) because (1) 
 
or 
 
 (9) If (1) & (2), (1) because (2) ? 
 
There is one reason for thinking that we should accept neither. Instances of  
 
 (10) p because p, 
 
the “because” of the exasperated parent, are all false. So a philosopher who thinks that (1) and (2) 
are completely synonymous or that they express the same proposition, should reject both (8) and 
(9). But the fact that there are heated disagreements about the existence of propositions together 
with the fact that there is no such disagreement about the existence of creatures like Sam is 
reason enough to think that (1) and (2) are not completely synonymous. Of the two, (8) and (9), 
(8) is clearly more plausible than (9). There are certainly true instances of  
 
 (11) If (1), (1) because p, 
 
for example, 
 
 (12) If (1), (1) because Sam has had some bad news, 
 
the causal “because”. But (9) is not a true instance of (11). 
 
 By the same token, we should accept 
 
(13) If (1), (3) because (1) 
(14) If (1), (4) because (1) 
(15) If (1), (5) because (1) 
(16) If (1), (6) because (1) 
 
But one might accept (8) and (13) and think that propositions just are states of affairs and that 
being true is just obtaining. Similarly, one might accept (14) and (16) and think that concepts just 
are properties and that falling under a concept just is exemplifying a property.  
 
 There are good reasons for thinking that concepts and properties are quite different 
creatures. We understand concepts but not properties; concepts, unlike properties, are clear or 
unclear2. We perceive properties but not concepts. Concepts are expressed by predicates and 
properties are the semantic values of predicates. We understand a predicate if we understand what 
concept it expresses. Philosophers sometimes talk of our grasp of properties and of concepts. But 
to grasp a concept is to understand it or to understand which concept a predicate express. To 
grasp a property, on the other hand, is to perceive it or to know which property is the semantic 
value of a predicate or concept.   
 
If concepts and properties are quite different creatures, then there is a good reason for 
thinking that propositions and states of affairs are in their turn very different creatures. 
Propositions contain concepts, only concepts, simple and complex. States of affairs, on the other 
hand, contain properties, simple and complex. 
 
 If we continue to suppose that there are propositions, states of affairs, concepts and 
properties and suppose that propositions are not states of affairs and that concepts are not 
properties, then we may ask whether we should accept 
 
(17)  If (2) & (3), (2) because (3) 
If the proposition that Sam is sad is true & the state of affairs that Sam is 
sad obtains, the proposition that Sam is sad is true because the state of 
affairs that Sam is sad obtains 
or 
 
 (18) If (2) & (3), (3) because (2) ? 
 
                                                 
2  Cf. Strawson 1987 404, Schnieder 2004 55-6. 
And similarly we may ask whether we should accept 
 
 (19) If (4) & (6), (4) because (6)  
If Sam falls under the concept of sadness and exemplifies the property of 
sadness, Sam falls under the concept of sadness because Sam exemplifies 
the property of sadness 
 
or 
 
 (20) If (4) & (6), (6) because (4) ? 
 
 
 One good reason for preferring (17) to (18) is the widespread intuition that truth is truth in 
virtue of something. It is true that not all philosophers share the intuition. But that is because 
these philosophers deny the existence of states of affairs, facts or properties or deny that facts 
differ from true propositions or concepts from properties. We are supposing that there are facts 
and properties and we have seen that are reasons for thinking that these are distinct from true 
propositions and concepts. 
 
 One reason for preferring (19) to (20) is that in order to find out whether Sam falls under 
the concept of sadness we try to see whether he exemplifies the property of sadness. We make 
estimates about the exemplification of the property of sadness not about falling under concepts. 
We formulate the results of our estimates in sentences containing the predicate “is sad” which 
expresses the concept of sadness. 
 
 (1) is an atomic sentence. The state of affairs that Sam is sad is an atomic state of affairs. 
(17) is an instance of the completely general claim: 
 
(21) If the proposition that p is true and the state of affairs that p obtains, the 
proposition that p is true because the state of affairs that p obtains. 
 
In order to defend (21) an argument must be given to show that there are obtaining states of 
affairs. Further, some reply must be given to the objection that there are indeed facts but they are 
one and all atomic. In §2 I give an argument for states of affairs. In §3 I give one reply to the 
objection. 
 
 
§2 An Argument for Facts from Knowledge 
 
 
 Does intentionality require us to accept facts ? An account of the intentionality of belief 
and of judgement, as we shall see, does not seem to require us to accept facts. They seem to be 
merely an option. An account of the intentionality of a type of mental act, state or attitude should 
indicate whether the type has conditions of correctness and conditions of satisfaction and, if so, 
state these. The conditions of satisfaction and the conditions of correctness for beliefs and 
judgements may mention facts and propositions but need not do so. 
 
 Consider 
 
 (1) x judges that p 
 (2) x judges correctly that p 
 (3) The proposition that p is true 
 (4) The state of affairs that p obtains 
 (5) p 
 
If we already have reason to believe that there are propositions and facts, we may assert  
 
 (6) If (2), then (3) 
 
and 
 (7) If (2), (2) because (3) 
 (8) If (2), (2) because (4) 
 
But whether or not we endorse propositions and facts, we should accept  
 
 (9) If (2), then (5) 
 (10) If (2), then (2) because (5) 
 
But then, for the purposes of an account of the correctness conditions of judgements, facts and 
propositions are superfluous to requirements. The same is true of accounts of the satisfaction 
conditions of judgements. Consider 
 
 (11) x’s judgement that p is satisfied 
 (12) If (11), then (3) 
 (13) If (11), (11) because (5). 
 
And what holds for judgement holds, too, for belief. Indeed, it may seem that in the case of 
judgement and belief there is no difference between conditions of correctness and conditions of 
satisfaction. Whether or not this is true, there is a clear difference between conditions of 
correctness and satisfaction in the case of attitudes or states other than judgement and belief. 
Consider 
 
 (14) x desires to F 
 (15) x correctly desires to F 
 (16) x’s desire to F is satisfied 
(17) x ought to F 
(18) Fx becausecausal (14) 
 
(14) has both a correctness condition, 
 
 (19) If (15), then (17) 
 
and a satisfaction condition: 
 
 (20) If (16), then (18) 
 
Oughtness, like being true and obtaining, is formal property; it is a property which (here) takes a 
property to make a property. No formal property is attributed in the satisfaction condition for 
desires. 
 
 Emotions and sentiments, on the other hand, have correctness conditions: 
 
 (21) x prefers y to z 
 (22) x correctly prefers y to z 
 (23) y is better than z 
 (24) If (22), then (23) 
 
but no satisfaction conditions. And betterness, like exemplification, is a formal relation. 
 
 An account of the intentionality of belief and judgement, then, apparently does not require 
us to accept facts. Does any type of intentionality require us to accept facts ? Here is an argument 
to show that a plausible account of one type of knowledge requires facts.  
 
Knowledge or epistemic contact with the world comes in at least four distinct kinds. There 
is knowledge that p, which is no episode, and there is coming to know that p (“erkennen, dass 
p”), which is an episode. There is acquaintance with objects, which is no episode, and there is 
coming to be acquainted with (seeing, hearing) objects, making their acquaintance, which is. 
 
 Philosophers sometimes mention, alongside the distinction between cognitive episodes 
and cognitive states or dispositions a distinction between propositional and non-propositional 
knowledge. This distinction may be understood as a grammatical distinction between uses of 
“know” where the verb takes sentential complements and uses where it does not. But it may also 
be used to mark a distinction between propositional and non-propositional acts or attitudes, where 
a propositional act involves thinking a thought and so conceptual representation. I shall assume 
that there are cases of coming to know that p where the subject does not think any thought – Erna 
sees that Sam is smiling but she thinks no thoughts. And I shall call only cases where one comes 
to know that p by having the thought that p “propositional coming to know that p”. 
 
The different European terms for what is supposed to be one and the same philosophical 
discipline highlight different members of the knowledge family – “Erkenntnislehre”, 
“Wissenschaftslehre”, “théorie de la connaissance”, “theory of knowledge”. One trait common to 
all four kinds of epistemic contact with the world is identification. In visual, non-propositional 
perception identification and reidentification of one and the same object or property goes on 
continuously. Similarly, in coming to know that p and in propositional coming to know that p 
there is a process of identification. The visual acquaintance which is the result of coming to be 
acquainted with an object inherits the result of the process of identification. Similarly, the state or 
disposition which is knowledge that p, the result of coming to know that p,  inherits the result of a 
process of identification. 
 
 How, then, does identification work in the case where one propositionally comes to know 
that p ? Consider  
 
(35) x perceptually and propositionally comes to know (erkennt) that Sam is smiling 
 
According to the theory of identification, 
 
(36) x comes to know Æ x identifies y and z 
 
What, then, is it to identify and what is identified ? The psychological process of identifying is 
the psychological counterpart of the binary predicate of identity although it is not any judgement 
or thought of identity. Just as the binary predicate cannot be flanked by sentences, so too, 
identification identifies objects. It is thus unlike judgings and beliefs, which connect animate 
beings and non-objects. What objects are identified in identification ? One bad answer is 
 
(37) *x identifies that Sam is smiling, what x sees, and that Sam is smiling, what x 
represents 
 
There are, of course, true instances of  
 
(38) x identifies Sam’s smile, which x sees, and Sam’s smile, which x represents, 
perhaps by judging that this is Sam’s smile  
 
But these identifications are not examples of coming to know that Sam is smiling but are peculiar 
to one type of coming to be visually acquainted with something, one which involves “simple 
seeing” and demonstrative judgements of identity.  
 
 An alternative to (37) is: 
 
(39) x identifies the obtaining state of affairs that Sam is smiling, which x sees, with the 
obtaining state of affairs that Sam is smiling, which x represents 
 
 (40) (35) Æ (39) 
 
Since I cannot think of any alternative to (39) as an account of propositionally coming to know 
that p , I conclude that propositional coming to know that p requires obtaining states of affairs, 
that is, facts.  
 
Two comments on the identification theory of knowledge are in order. First, the locution 
 
the obtaining state of affairs that Sam is smiling, which x represents 
 
is ambiguous. It might be read as referring to a judgement or belief of x. Then the identification 
theory is committed to the view that propositionally coming to know that p contains, as a proper 
part or component, a belief or judgement, which is formed on the basis of perception. But the 
locution may also be read as referring simply to a propositional representation of an obtaining 
state of affairs. Then the identification theory is not committed to the view that propositionally 
coming to know that p contains belief or judgement. On each reading of the locution, the 
identification theory is committed to the view that propositionally coming to know that p is 
complex. But on the second reading, propositionally coming to know that p involves no doxastic 
complexity. In favour of the second reading is the fact that one may wonder whether Sam is 
smiling and then see that he is and so come propositionally to know that this is the case, a process 
which involves neither belief nor judgement. 
 
 Secondly, as we have seen, judgements and beliefs have correctness conditions and, so it 
seemed, we may but need not say that these refer to facts. Knowledge, on the other hand, has 
neither correctness conditions nor satisfaction conditions. Knowledge is, so to speak, already 
correct and self-satisfied3. One very good reason for thinking that knowledge does not contain 
belief is the fact that our beliefs and convictions are reactions to our coming to know that p or to 
our apparently coming to know that p and have degrees. Reactions are positive or negative and 
belief, too, is positive or negative (belief and disbelief). Knowledge is never a reaction and is 
never either positive or negative, nor does it come in degrees. 
 
 If our beliefs are reactions to propositional knowledge (“Erkenntnisüberzeugungen”) or to 
apparent knowledge, rather than components of knowledge, and if such knowledge requires facts, 
then it is apparent why we should indeed say that a belief that p is correct if the state of affairs 
that p obtains and because of this. Belief is a reaction to knowledge that or apparent knowledge 
that and knowledge that involves identifications of facts. 
 
 
§3 Facts are not Ontologically Fundamental 
 
 In §1 we considered 
 
If the proposition that Sam is sad is true, the proposition that Sam is sad is true because 
Sam is sad 
If the state of affairs that Sam is sad obtains, the state of affairs that Sam is sad obtains 
because Sam is sad 
If the proposition that Sam is sad is true, the proposition that Sam is sad is true because 
the state of affairs that Sam is sad obtains 
 
These are instances of purely general claims, of, respectively, 
 
 (41) If the proposition that p is true, the proposition that p is true because p 
 (42) If the state of affairs that p obtains, the state of affairs that p obtains because p 
(43) If the proposition that p is true, the proposition that p is true because the state of 
affairs that p obtains. 
 
                                                 
3 I believe that the argument for facts from knowledge presented here is, at the very least, in the spirit of Husserl’s 
account of knowledge. Certainly, Husserl clearly argues that identifying is central to knowledge and that identifying 
is not to to be confused with judgements of identity (LI VI §47, LI p. 790). Perusal of  what Husserl says at LU VI 
§8, LI p. 696 (cf. VI §7 LI p. 691), however, will make clear why I hesitate to attribute the view presented here to 
Husserl. It is also true that many, although not all of Husserl’s formulations, suggest that he thought that 
propositional knowledge contains belief. 
 
(41) is uncontroversial, if there are propositions. (42) is highly controversial and so is (43), which 
is one version of truth-maker maximalism. One reason for rejecting (42) is the view that 
assertions, or propositions to the effect that, for example, Sam is sad, represent or depict or are in 
some other way “about” the state of affairs that Sam is sad. But the assertion or proposition that 
Sam is sad is about Sam, it contains no representation, nominal, predicative or sentential, of any 
state of affairs. The fact that the state of affairs that Sam is sad is mentioned in the correctness 
condition for the judgement that Sam is sad does not entail that the judgement or the proposition 
are “about” any state of affairs. 
 
Perhaps the main reason for rejecting (43) is adherence to 
 
 (44) Every obtaining state of affairs is ontologically fundamental 
 
Some friends of facts have occasionally accepted negative and disjunctive obtaining states of 
affairs or facts and taken these to be as ontologically fundamental as atomic facts. But most 
philosophers who have been prepared to accept facts have denied that non-atomic facts could be 
fundamental and so have denied that there are such things. Thus friends of facts who endorse (44) 
typically accept only those instances of (43) which countenance atomic facts. 
 
 In order to decrease the implausibility of (43) I propose to argue that no fact is 
ontologically fundamental. Answers must therefore be given to the following three questions. 
What does it mean to say that something is ontologically fundamental ? What are the most 
plausible candidates for the role of what is ontologically fundamental, if facts cannot play this 
role ? How are the ontologically fundamental and the ontologically non-fundamental related to 
one another ? 
 
 We already possess the beginnings of an answer to the first question. Consider again 
 
(1) Sam is sad 
(2) The proposition that Sam is sad is true 
(3) The state of affairs that Sam is sad obtains 
(8) If Sam is sad and the proposition that Sam is sad is true, then the proposition that 
Sam is sad is true because Sam is sad 
(9) If Sam is sad and the state of affairs that Sam is sad obtains, then the state of 
affairs that Sam is sad obtains because Sam is sad 
(17) If the proposition that Sam is sad is true and the state of affairs that Sam is sad 
obtains, then the proposition that Sam is sad is true because the state of affairs that 
Sam is sad obtains 
 
The “because”s in (8) and (9) tell us that (1) is more fundamental than (2) and more fundamental 
than (3). The “because” in (8), (9) and (17) is the essential “because”, not any causal “because”4. 
As far as I can see, there is no true instance of  
 
                                                 
4 The essential “because” is essential to a correct formulation of truth-maker maximalism. But it is not enough. The 
truth-maker principle itself holds because of the nature of truth and of propositions. This “because” is the “because” 
of essence. On this view and its history, cf Mulligan 2006, 2006a, 2006b. 
 (45) (1) becauseessential p 
 
If that is right, then not only is (1) more fundamental than (2) or (3), it is fundamental. But what 
does it mean to say that something is ontologically more fundamental than something else and 
that something is ontologically fundamental tout court ?  
 
 The answer to our second question will help to provide an answer to this question. The 
second question was: What are the most plausible candidates for the role of what is ontologically 
fundamental if facts cannot play this role ? 
 
Sam is ontologically more fundamental than any proposition and ontologically more 
fundamental than any fact. Now there are two rival views about just what ontological category 
Sam belongs to. For a very long time, it has been thought that Sam and his ilk are enduring things 
or substances. A more recent view has it that Sam is in fact a rather long process. The categories 
of substance and process are good candidates for the role of what is ontologically fundamental. 
To these two categories we may add that of states, such as states of sadness. It is true that if there 
are both substances and processes, then we may want to argue that processes are less fundamental 
than substances. And if we add to the list of what is ontologically basic space-time itself, then we 
may want to say that space-time is more fundamental than any thing, if space-time is no thing. 
Our candidates, so far, for the role of what is ontologically fundamental or at least relatively 
fundamental are all acceptable to the nominalist ontologist or metaphysician. An anti-nominalist 
list of candidates would add the category of kinds – kinds of things, kinds of processes, kinds of 
states. 
 
If substances, processes, states and kinds are ontologically fundamental or ontologically 
more fundamental than facts, properties and relations, then (a) nothing on the list of what is 
fundamental is identical with anything on the list of what is not fundamental and (b) nothing on 
the first list is such that it can be constructed out of what is on the second list. 
 
Let me briefly sketch how one might begin to argue for such claims. 
 
Ad (a) 
 
(a) implies all of the following: States and processes are not properties, neither multiply-
exemplifiable properties nor unit-properties. Relational states, processes and events are not 
relations, neither multiply-exemplifiable relations nor unit-relations. Admiration, collisions and 
fights are relational or relation-like but are not relations. It is perhaps preferable to talk of one-
legged states, processes and events, two-legged, three-legged…. states and processes. Kinds are 
not properties. 
 
Sam’s property of barking is either a unit-property (a bearer-specific property) or a 
multiply-exemplifiable (bearer non-specific) property. In neither case is it identical with his 
barking, which is a process. The process of barking has temporal parts. Properties have no 
temporal parts. Properties, it may be thought, are always determinable or determinate properties. 
Processes and states are neither determinables nor determinates. 
 
Sam’s property of being sad is not identical with his state of sadness. His state of sadness 
lasts for a period of time. Sam has or exemplifies the property of being sad for a period of time. 
His state of sadness has boundaries. Properties have no boundaries. 
 
Things, states and processes and events all exist or do not exist in the sense of the 
existential quantifier. They also have modes of being. Things and states endure. Processes go on. 
Properties perhaps enjoy a mode of being, too; they obtain, like states of affairs and numbers. But 
properties neither endure nor do they occur. 
 
Binary relations have order properties and converses; two-legged processes and states 
have no order-properties and no converses. 
 
Kinds are instantiated by instances. Sam, if he is a man, instantiates homo sapiens. His 
state of sadness instantiates Sadness. His jump instantiates the kind Jump. Properties are 
exemplified, if they are multiply-exemplifiable; they inhere if they are bearer-specific. 
Instantiation is not exemplification. Instantiation is always an internal relation. Exemplification 
may be an external relation. Kinds, like properties, may be understood in Aristotelian or in 
Platonistic fashion. An Aristotelian kind is always instantiated, unlike a Platonic kind. There are 
kinds of properties but no kind is a property. 
 
Properties are predicable. Kinds are not predicable. Man cannot be predicated because 
“man” is a singular term. We can of course predicate the property of being a man. On the 
standard view, “is a man” has no internal structure. 
 
It has been claimed that things or particulars are identical with facts5. But this view is 
somewhat unclear and is most plausible as a claim to the effect that we can consider things by 
themselves and as parts of states of affairs. 
 
 
Ad (b) 
 
 It has been claimed that processes and states can be constructed out of properties, objects 
and intervals. But the many reasons for thinking that there are neither properties nor relations, for 
endorsing the nominalist view that there are processes and perhaps states and things but no 
propositions, facts, properties or relations, are presumably available also to the metaphysician 
who wants to distinguish between what is ontologically basic and what is ontologically 
secondary. According to such a metaphysician, there are propositions, facts, properties and 
relations but these entities are not ontologically basic. After all, there are social entities but social 
entities are not ontologically fundamental. 
 
 The picture we have arrived at is this: 
  
Logical level: propositions, concepts 
 
Logico-ontological level : objects, properties, relations, facts 
 
                                                 
5 Cf. Johansson 2004. 
Ontological level : space-time, things, states, processes, – and kinds thereof 
 
Our third question was: How are the ontologically fundamental and the ontologically non-
fundamental related to one another ? How is the logico-ontological level related to the 
ontological level ? Suppose that Sam is an enduring substance. Then although it is wrong to say 
 
(46) *Sam makes Sam exist, 
 
the following are all plausible: 
 
(47) Sam makes the state of affairs that Sam exists obtain 
(48) Sam’s sadness makes the state of affairs that Sam is sad obtain 
(49) Sam’s jump makes the state of affairs that Sam jumps obtain 
(50) Sam’s jump over the fence makes the state of affairs that Sam jumps over the 
fence obtain 
 
Suppose, now, that Sam is a process. Then (46) is still unacceptable or false and (47)-(50) still 
hold. 
 
The least ambitious version of truth-maker maximalism, the one which involves no toil at 
all (because it is a simple, a priori truth), 
 
(43) If the proposition that p is true, the proposition that p is true because the state of 
affairs that p obtains, 
 
looks much more plausible, I suggest,  when we drop the assumption that obtaining states of 
affairs must be ontologically fundamental. But fact-maker maximalism 
 
(51) If the state of affairs that p obtains, something makes the state of affairs that p  
obtains 
 
is obviously false. Nothing makes the state of affairs that there are neither witches nor genders 
obtain although this state of affairs certainly obtains. Friends of truth-making who reject truth-
maker maximalism should really endorse (43) and reject (51).  
 
Many friends of truth-making have repeatedly asserted that truth-making is really a 
relation (an internal relation). Is it ? Nominalisation of part of (43) yields 
 
(52) If the proposition that p is true, the obtaining state of affairs that p makes the 
proposition that p true 
 
In (52) “makes” is elliptic for “because”, the binary functor. A binary functor, in particular a 
functor that takes two sentences, is not a relational expression. Nor is its semantic value, if it has 
one, a relation6. However, “makes” in (47)-(50) is not elliptic for the binary connective 
                                                 
6 The causal “because” which takes two sentences to make a sentence may be thought to entail that a causal relation 
between, say, events, holds. But the causal relation is not the semantic value of the “because”. 
“because”. Fact-making really is a relation when the maker is ontologically basic. It is this 
relation and its relata that friends of truth-making should be toiling over. 
 
I have given an argument for facts from knowledge and tried to explicate and make 
plausible the claim that no facts are ontologically fundamental. The two projects are 
complementary in a way which should be attractive to all metaphysical realists. The facts which 
are the objects of propositional coming to know that p are, like all facts, ontologically secondary. 
They are the tips of icebergs. Knowledge is always given as knowledge of the tip of an iceberg. 
We know that there is more to what we know than what we know. 
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